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ABSTRACT 
 
Based in New York, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) has been working in the 
Sudan since the 1980’s. During this time, this Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
has shown itself to be a leader in its field. Funded by numerous agencies and aiding 
hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries, IRC’s role in Sudan is constantly growing. Poised 
between the people whom it serves and the Government of Sudan, in whose territory it 
operates, the NGO roles as advocates and social service providers places them in a 
challenging position. 
 
Since the first international NGOs entered Sudan during the great famine and war in the 
1980’s, the government has become increasingly suspicious of their actions. More 
recently, however, NGOs have become more commonplace in Sudan, funding and 
managing many of the social programmes in the country, including education, health 
care, water and sanitation and even infrastructure projects. This presence in the country 
has lent international political clout to NGOs, but has created resentment by the Sudanese 
government. 
 
This situation is not unique. Around the globe many countries are being pressured by 
NGOs to alter policy direction. The concept of good governance has become prevalent in 
Western funding departments and donor organisations, calling for its use to encourage 
governments to become more democratic. In order to access funding, NGOs must 
therefore shift their focus to a greater emphasis on ‘good governance’ as well. This is 
indeed the case of the IRC whose broad mission includes strengthening civil society and 
enabling good governance in Sudan. 
 
The strong presence of NGOs combined with the sheer number of people they serve, the 
types of services that they provide, and their influence both nationally and internationally 
has lent credibility to the belief that these organisations are important entities in Sudan. 
However, the ability to carry out their mandates in times of emergencies and crisis is 
challenging as they must work within the constructs of the communities in which they 
serve and with the government of Sudan, which controls several of their activities. 
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“You come from Nairobi and London and you just eat and 
sleep. You’ve never done any work as you don’t cultivate”  
-----Dinka Song, sung to Oxfam’s project evaluation team 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “IRC does not chase headlines. It goes to and stays in places 
no one wants to be. The scope of the organisation’s work is 
immense, but the mission remains simple: to help alleviate the 
suffering of refugees by whatever means necessary.”1 
------General Colin Powell, 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 “History of IRC,” (New York: International Rescue Committee, 2005), 19, 
<www.theirg.org/about/history.html> (Retrieved January 20, 2007). 
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CHAPTER ONE: Non Governmental Organisations in Sudan 
 
 Sudan, named after the Arabic phrase for ‘land of the blacks’, is a country of 
immense racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. At the meeting place of the Blue 
and White Nile rivers, African and Arab cultures intertwine to create a unique blend of 
beliefs and ways of life. Sudan is also a land of near constant crisis and instability, where 
the spring rains or the distribution of aid determines who will prosper and who will 
perish. In the past thirty years, International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) 
have become part of the scenery of the Sudan. White Land Rovers rule the road and NGO 
emblems mark many schools, hospitals and water wells, branding much of the region’s 
infrastructure. 
In Sudan alone, there are over 60 INGOs (International NGOs), plus an 
incalculable number of National NGOs (NNGOs), Government Operated NGOs 
(GONGOs) and environmental NGOs (ENGOs), plus a whole host of others.2 The 
importance of NGOs has been steadily mounting in the past thirty years. In 2005, U.N. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared, “Without the vital role of NGOs, the world 
could not respond to the myriad of crises.”3 In fact, NGOs have even won the Nobel 
Peace Prize, as in the case of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and 
Doctors without Borders. As the sheer number of NGOs that have entered the 
international development scene has multiplied, so too have the focus, directives, goals, 
types of funding, and importance underlying their operations. 
                                               
2 United Nations Resident Humanitarian Coordinator, United Nations and Partners Workplan for Sudan 
2007 (Khartoum: United Nations Press, 2006), 10-12. 
3“Calls on NGOs to Assess Summit's Outcome Document,” (United Nations Information Service 
SG/SM/10085 NGO/582 PI/1674 12, September 2005). 
<www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/sgsm10085.html> (Retrieved January 19, 2007). 
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NGOs are often defined in broad characterizations, for instance: “officially 
established, run by employed staff (usually urban professionals or expatriates), well 
supported (by domestic, or most often international funding), and that are often well 
resourced and funded.”4 Alternatively, they are “independent, non-profit, non-violent, 
voluntary, organizations operating at the local, national, and/or transnational levels that 
are neither government nor business.”5 Both of these descriptions are broad and all 
encompassing, and are unique in each of their perceptions. However, generalizations of 
NGOs can also be dangerous, as not all NGOs are voluntary, independent, or well 
resourced. Even within NGO’s, country programs are often not managed with the same 
methodology or goals. What can be agreed upon is that NGOs are entities that fall outside 
of the government sphere, however how far outside is often debated.6 For this thesis, 
NGOs are defined as international non-governmental entities that operate in another 
country (the host country) for the purposes of post-conflict development or poverty 
alleviation. 
One of the main contributions of NGOs is that of ethically transferring and 
dispersing goods, services, and expertise. NGOs have the responsibility to exhibit the 
highest ethical behaviour in their own activities including: transparency, fiscal 
accountability, fairness, honesty, responsiveness, participation, as well as the 
empowerment of beneficiaries – essentially the elements of good governance. It is 
important to recognize the emergence of the concept of ‘good governance’ and that the 
creation of a strong ‘civil society’ was due in part to aid practitioners and academics 
                                               
4 Clair Mercer, “NGOs, Civil Society, and Democratization in the Developing World: A critical review of 
the literature,” Progress in Development Studies, 2(1), 2002, 6.  
5 Jonathan Cohen, “Governance by and of NGOs,” (London: AccountAbility, 2004), 96. 
6 Grace Chikoto, “Government Funding and the NGOs Autonomy: A Tool Choice Approach,” (Atlanta: 
Georgia State University, 2007), 3. 
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itemizing and focusing on the conditions needed to build a liberal democratic state, as 
these democracies were perceived to be more efficient in dealing with social dissent and 
conflict. Good governance as a mechanism for development was brought into focus by a 
wide variety of international actors including the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, the United Nations and its agencies, multinational corporations and donor countries 
through such institutions as USAID (United States Agency for International 
Development) and CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency). 
Good governance has been conceptualized as the act of maximizing the link 
between the state and society. The United Nations defines ‘good governance’ as having 
“8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law”.7 
Further, good governance is defined as ensuring “that corruption is minimized, the views 
of minorities are taken into account, and the voices of the most vulnerable in society are 
heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of 
society.”8 Goran Hyden, on the other hand, defines good governance as “aspects of 
politics that aims to formulate and manage the rules of the political arena in which state 
and civil society actors operate and interact to make authoritative decisions.”9 
For the most part good governance is a Western construct, as there are some key 
differences between African and Western models of democracy and governance. Despite 
these differences, good governance has been promoted to Africa through bilateral aid 
                                               
7 “What is Good Governance?” United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 
<http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivies/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp> (Retrieved September 16, 
2007). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Goren Hyden, “Governance and the Reconstitution of Political Order,” in State, Conflict, and Democracy 
in Africa ed. Richard Joseph (Boulder:Lynne Rienner, 1999), 185. 
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transfers from donor governments to NGOs. Many international funders such as USAID, 
DFID (Department of Foreign International Development), and CIDA created new 
portfolios during the 1990’s dedicated to promoting democracy.10 USAID, for instance, 
encouraged democracy through funding ‘effective civil society and human rights’.11 To 
this end, USAID budgeted $637 million in 1999 alone.12 Yash Tandon observes that the 
West has been attempting to promote good governance in Africa through democracy 
since post-independence, with little progress.13 The lack of success in this area is 
attributed to the entrenchment of cultural norms on the continent. In Africa, foreign and 
domestic forces often use their power to influence political outcomes, which are often 
driven by informal and formal community relations.14 Many people in Sudan live in 
small-scale societies where political and economic transactions are often conducted in 
person. In fact, for the majority of Africans, a choice to vote will involve selecting the 
best person who will protect and promote the interests of their particular community.15 
Questions arise, however, in areas that are in crisis or conflict or which have a 
lack of government control and legitimacy, as to whether ‘good governance’ is relevant. 
In these situations, many of the core functions of government shift (willingly or 
unwillingly) from the State to NGOs and other civil society groups. In fact, across the 
developing world, NGOs have become significant actors at the very base of society, often 
                                               
10 Sharon Carapico, “Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in the Arab world,” Middle East Journal 56(3), 
381.  
11 Alison Ayers, “Demystifying Democratization: the global constitution of (neo)liberal polities in Africa,” 
Third World Quarterly (27)2, 2006, 325. 
12 Stephen Brown, “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa,” The European Journal 
of Development Research (17)2, 2005, 182. 
13 Yash Tandon, “Reclaiming Africa’s Agenda: Good Governance and the Role of the NGO in the African 
Context,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 50(3), 1996, 297. 
14 Hyden, 185. 
15 Ibid, 188. 
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reflecting the core parameters of ‘good governance’ in a manner far beyond the ability or 
proclivity of the State. 
It is here that the central focus of this thesis is situated. From my own work and 
research, my attention has been drawn to the tension that exists between the government 
of Sudan and NGOs in relation to the management of infrastructure, development 
activities, and humanitarian and disaster relief efforts. The expansion of NGO activity 
into the realm of good governance leads one to question whether NGOs have exceeded 
their purview, and to what degree this mandate can be accomplished. This thesis will seek 
to understand the objectives of the International Rescue Committee in Sudan, and the 
challenge of working with and against the Government of Sudan. It will identify how the 
lack of policies and mandates of NGOs affect the relationship with beneficiaries, the 
State and donors, and will illustrate the inherent tension that exists within the context of 
an uncooperative State, specifically a State that seeks to limit and define narrowly the 
autonomy of the NGO. An examination of NGOs that promote good governance in 
general, with attention on the International Rescue Committee (IRC) will demonstrate 
that while NGOs do assume a great amount of responsibility, these entities are constantly 
attempting to carve out room to manoeuvre, limiting their success. Finally, the lessons 
learned from the Sudanese experience will be highlighted. 
Since the 1950’s, there has been an expansion of academic literature into the 
realm of NGOs that focused on six key areas: service and aid delivery, policy, advocacy, 
civil society building, and good governance and democracy promotion. Clair Mercer, 
professor at the University of Leicester, chronicled the literature of NGOs and 
 6 
democratization and noted a considerable change in debates since the 1990’s.16 She found 
that academics were initially more concerned about efficacy and aid delivery, and then 
shifted into the area of good governance and democracy promotion.17 Mercer noted that 
the relationship between NGOs, civil society and government is often entrenched in a 
liberal democratic assumption, rather then examined more broadly.18 Presently there is a 
dearth of information within the literature in regards to the autonomy or the ‘space’ 
needed for an NGO to accomplish its mandate. One also finds that the study of NGO 
management and political studies has not examined the policies needed to operate within 
an authoritarian, coercive, political environment.19 
In the past, there has been only relatively positive literature promoting the need 
for NGOs, arguing their necessity in providing effective service and aid delivery for 
humanitarian reasons. However, NGOs also have their opponents who criticize NGO 
involvement in government and community affairs. In the last two decades, a growing 
academic debate has emerged on the role of NGOs in governance, mostly drawing on the 
African experience. Catherine Agg, for instance, believes that NGOs only represent one 
element of global civil society, but as they are “rooted in Western culture, do not work 
for the benefit of their own society, and are funded by single northern European country 
that NGOs are prone to having multiple loyalties.”20 Further criticisms include those of 
authors and journalists such as Michael Onyanyo and Rotimi Sankore who denounce 
                                               
16 Mercer, 5 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid 
19 David Lewis, The Management of Non Governmental Development Organizations (London, Routledge, 
2001), 6. 
20 Catherine Agg, “Trends in Government Support for Non Governmental Organisations: Is the “golden 
age” of NGOs behind us?” (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, United Nations 
Civil Society and Social Movements Paper 23, June 2006), 3. 
 7 
international NGOs as being non-representative institutions.21 Some critics go so far as to 
accuse NGOs of being a form of colonialism or societal engineering.22 “In the days of 
old-fashioned colonialism, the metropolitan powers sent their officials to live in Africa 
and directly run the colonies. Today they do so indirectly through NGOs.”23 Another 
recent critic is Rory Stewart, a Farsi-speaking British diplomat, who has written a 
scathing account of NGOs, United Nations officials, and policy makers in Afghanistan. 
“Most of the policy-makers knew next to nothing about the villages where 90 per cent of 
the Afghan population lived… They came from postmodern, secular, globalized states 
with liberal traditions in law and government.”24 Stewart believes there are few 
distinctions between colonialist administrators and post-conflict experts. He argues 
“[t]heir implicit denial of the differences between cultures is the new brand of 
international intervention. Their policies fail and no one notices. There are no credible 
monitoring bodies and there is no one to take responsibility.”25 
Another growing hypothesis regarding NGOs supposes that in order to be 
effective, NGOs must have enough room to operate and function, especially in Africa.26. 
Governments can manipulate NGOs to such a high degree that they negatively affect the 
outcomes, as NGOs can lose their freedom to operate and become bogged down in red 
tape. Critics note that African governments are not above hijacking NGO resources for 
                                               
21 Rotimi Sankore, “What are the NGOs Doing?” New African August/September 2005, 13. and  
Michael Onyanyo. “NGOs Pseudo Governments or Surrogates of Western Powers,” New African 
(August/September) 2005, 20-21. 
22 Julie Hearn, “ NGO-isation of Kenyan Society: USAID & the Restructuring of Health Care,” Review of 
African Public Policy (75) 1998, 90. 
23 Sankore, 13.  
24 Rory Wente, “The Trouble with Nation-Building,” Globe and Mail Saturday June 23, 2007, A21.  Article 
based on book: Rory Stewart, Places in Between (London: Picador, 2006). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Zenebe Nega Bashaw, “NGO-Government Relations: Conflict and Co-operation in Development 
Management for Rehabilitations of Demobilized Soldiers: the Case of Eastern Tigray, Ethiopia,” Africa 
Development (26)1, 2, 2001, 252. 
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their own use.27 Governments will monopolize NGO resources, so as to give the 
perception that the government administrates the NGOs projects and programs; called an 
“official capture.”28 NGOs advocacy roles can also shape government policy decisions 
and likewise, States can have a role in the managing of NGOs.29 Emmanuel Gyimah-
Boadi observed that as NGOs have attained prominence in the economic and political 
realm, governments have become determined to control them.30 There is the perception 
that because NGOs are lent a great amount of importance, they hinder the ability of 
governments to provide social services.31 This is an antagonistic relationship, whereby 
States attempt to quell the autonomy of NGOs, and NGOs endeavour to create room to 
manoeuvre. This opposition of efforts is certainly the case in Sudan where the 
government restricts the movement, creation, and management of the NGOs. 
There is a widening rift between rhetoric and practice, objective monitoring and 
evaluation of projects, effectiveness, legitimacy, performance, and accountability within 
NGOs.32 NGOs are diverse and controversial, however, they are never truly neutral.33 
These criticisms will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Three. However, it is 
sufficient to say that NGOs require a number of reforms in order to remedy the issues of 
                                               
27 Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, “Civil Society in Africa,” Journal of Democracy (7) 2, 1996, 125. 
28 Hugo Slim, “What happens to Governments when NGOs are around?” Reuters News April 12, 2007. 
<http://www.alertnet.org/> (Retrieved May 11, 2007). 
29 John D. Clark, “NGOs and the State,” in The Companion to Development Studies 2ed. (London: Hodder 
Education, 2002), 532. 
29 Michael Edwards and David Hulme, “Performance and Accountability: Introduction and Overview,” in 
Non Governmental Organisations – Performance and Accountability: Beyond the Magic Bullet ed. Michael 
Edwards and David Hulme, (London: Earthscan, 1995), 9. 
30Gyimah-Boadi, 125. 
31 Agg, 2. 
32 Vandana Desai, “The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),” in The Companion to 
Development Studies 2nd ed., ed. Vandana Desai and Robert Potter, (London: Hodder Education, 2002), 
529. 
33 Peter Willets, “What is a Non Governmental Organization,” (London: UNESCO, 2002), 11. 
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over-concentration, lack of coordination and evaluation, and adaptation to global and 
local agendas in order to accomplish their mandates.34 
 Critiques aside, NGOs have seen their presence and activities delve more and 
more into the governmental sphere due to project funding that focuses on `good 
governance’. NGOs have taken on advocacy roles to ensure that governments are held 
accountable and that their beneficiaries’ voices are heard. Research findings confirm this 
in the case of the International Rescue Committee, a New York and London-based NGO 
whose IRC-Sudan programme is its largest venture. 
The International Rescue Committee has an estimated local staff in Sudan of 
approximately 1,000 and around 75 international staff on the ground. The organisation 
was a part of the initial group of NGOs to provide much needed aid and services to the 
people of Sudan and has shown itself to be a leader in the field of relief and development. 
The IRC is also one of the largest NGOs in Sudan and has active projects in every corner 
of the country. The organisation’s long-term goal is “to improve Sudanese people’s 
ability to manage their own livelihoods, while enabling individuals and communities to 
work towards accountable governance, stability, and security through an active civil 
society.”35 This central promotion of ‘good governance’ and a strong civil society by the 
International Rescue Committee is the focus of this thesis. The author will examine 
specifically what ‘good governance’ means to the IRC as well as which policies and 
programmes promote this mandate and the core constraints on its fulfillment. 
                                               
34 Robert Glasser, “Why we need to look hard at the NGOs’ flaws,” Europe’s World, Spring 2008. 
<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/78/Default.aspx?Id=0b29bd24-abdf-4e43-97a7-
c63bd28b6285> (Retrieved August 24, 2008). 
35 “Program Summary 2004-2005,” (Khartoum: International Rescue Committee – Sudan, Internal 
document for staff, March 2005), 1. 
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The Sudanese government narrowly defines the autonomy of the International 
Rescue Committee in all of their functions. The ability to manoeuvre is carefully guarded 
by the NGO, as the government can easily manipulate its opaque laws and policies in 
order to smother the IRC’s activities internally. It is within this context that the IRC must 
operate, while remaining accountable to its members. At the same time, they must obtain 
independence from donors and governments, and be accountable to its beneficiaries.36 
This dependent relationship between the government of Sudan and NGOs indicates the 
continuing power of the State as well as the decline in its capacity to control the growth 
and function of NGOs. One is compelled to ask how much autonomy is needed for the 
International Rescue Committee to effectively carry out its mandate? 
 The research for this thesis was undertaken in two stages. The first stage was 
conducted on the ground in the Sudan from October 2005 to May 2006 when the author 
was engaged as a Grants Manager with the International Rescue Committee. Due to lack 
of staff, which is common among NGOs, the author became Acting Grants Coordinator 
in charge of the management of all project proposals, reports, and summaries that 
covered the entire Sudan. My appointment gave me access to all areas of the IRC 
operations including a central view of the administration, logistical operations, the 
budgeting process, financial accountability and human resource issues. The second stage 
of the research effort included the review of primary documents, anonymous interviews 
with IRC employees and former employees as well as examining secondary sources 
drawing on journal articles, books and newspapers. 
                                               
36 Julie Fisher, “Local and Global: International Governance and Civil Society,” Journal of International 
Affairs 57 (Fall: 2003), 27.  
 11 
 Beyond the Introduction, the thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter Two 
introduces the Sudan and provides an initial overview of the IRC’s involvement as an 
autonomous NGO in the country. In Chapter Three, the author will examine the work of 
the IRC from a critical perspective on the issue of ‘good governance’. Attention is also 
devoted to the fragile relationship that exists between a wary and recalcitrant government 
and an assertive and effective IRC. In the concluding chapter, the author provides an 
assessment of the IRC and NGOs in developing country settings and an overview of the 
lessons gained from the IRC experience. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Overview of IRC and Sudan 
 
This chapter will examine the origins of Sudan, namely its history, current 
government, conflicts, economy, and environment. It is essential to review these elements 
in order to give context to the current predicaments of the Government of Sudan in 
regards to its relationship with NGOs. Next, the chapter will examine the developments 
that led to the mounting number of NGOs in Sudan, and specifically to the current roles 
of the IRC. It is essential to understand some of the history of the IRC, in the Sudan to 
gain perspective on the magnitude of the programmes and their effects on the lives of the 
people they work with. Finally, the chapter will concentrate on the conflict between the 
Sudanese Government and International NGOs, which greatly shapes the roles and 
realms of influence of the IRC. 
The diverse history of Sudan dates back to the Egyptian pharaohs, however, the 
greatest influence on today’s geopolitical landscape was certainly the colonial period.37 
Europe’s scramble for Sudan began in 1821 with the Ottoman Empire. The British 
followed in 1885, claiming most of modern day Sudan. The Belgians declared part of 
Southern Sudan in 1892 as part of the Belgian Congo and, not to be left out, the French 
also staked a claim, taking over the present day Bhar el Ghazal and Western Upper Nile 
States. The Belgians and the French both seceded their territory to the British between 
1910 and 1920 and by January 1, 1956, the British, who governed from Egypt, had 
renounced their rule, and arranged for independence, complete with self-government and 
a new constitution for the colonially-formed country of Sudan. Sudan’s post-
                                               
37 Helen Chapin Metz, Sudan: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress, 1991), 7.  
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independence period was similar to most newly created African nations, as the years to 
follow were marked by a series of coup d’etats in 1969, 1971, 1976, 1985, and 1989. 
 
1.a Political Map of Sudan38 
 
Needless to say, the years after independence were challenging. Today we find 
the country remains divided by historic colonial ties, government administration, 
religious beliefs, economics, language, and the environment. Certainly, the country has 
been in a near constant state of flux since independence. Presently, Sudan is governed by 
President Umar Ahmed al-Bashir, who has ruled Sudan both as the leader of a military 
                                               
38  Human Rights Watch. “Political Map of Sudan”, Retrieved from Human Rights Watch home page 
<www.hrw.org> (Retrieved July 14, 2007). 
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coup in 1989, and more recently as a democratically elected leader. Al-Bashir heads a 
government comprised mainly of members of the National Congress Party. This party, 
formerly called the National Islamic Front, was formed by the Muslim Brotherhood in 
1986, who were largely responsible for instituting Muslim Shari’a law throughout the 
country. The Muslim Brotherhood popularity began in the late 1940’s with the objective 
of promoting Islamic beliefs with a ‘top down’ approach, obtaining its political base 
through strong student recruitment from universities. 
The National Islamic Front came into power in a military coup in 1989, after a 
poor showing of less than 10% of the national vote in the 1986 elections.39 The effect of 
this was the breaking down of democracy and the derailment of a promising peace 
process.40 In his initial days in power, al-Bashir managed to alienate most of the 
democrats and merchants, seizing business warehouse holdings, and imposing strict 
curfews. He relied heavily on Islamist activists to institute change and development that 
proved to be a double-edged sword as the country quickly became isolationist and 
spiralled into economic disarray. 
The National Islamic Front was democratically elected into government in 1996, 
giving executive and legislative powers to al-Bashir, who restructured the administration 
of the country with the creation of 26 States. Within these States, the Executives, 
Cabinets (1.a Map), and senior level state officials are appointed by the President and all 
power is ultimately centralized in Khartoum.41 
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The current government of Sudan is a strong and effective entity.42 From the 
central point in Khartoum, the presidential system of government is further divided into 
numerous sub-areas. At the executive level of government, a small number of people 
undertake the planning and general policies. These executives manage the sub-division of 
26 States, which are then further divided into localities, which are the municipal level of 
government.43 The strength of this government structure is due to the large number of 
leaders in the system that makes up the sub areas. The quintessential saying “divide and 
conquer” is the central pillar of the al-Bashir government. In Sudan, a government station 
or post comes with great prestige and wealth, forming a cadre of sycophants in the 
process. The cumulative effect decentralizes power through its budgeting mechanisms, 
which encourages the direct taxation and reimbursement by the populace for services 
rendered. This encourages bribery and nepotistic behaviour, which ultimately, only 
serves the select few who hold the positions to the detriment of the constituents. 
Al-Bashir’s new government was criticized internationally by the West, which 
accused the government of harbouring international terrorist groups including al-Qaeda. 
Bill Clinton’s administration bombed a pharmaceutical company in the capital of 
Khartoum, after the Central Intelligence Agency reported that it might be creating 
weapons for Osama Bin Laden. More recently, the al-Bashir administration has come 
under fire by the international community due to its failure to protect its population in 
Darfur, as well as the government’s inability to hold up to its Comprehensive Peace 
Agreements for ending the civil war with South Sudan. President al-Bashir has been 
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indicted by the UN international criminal court for crimes against humanity for his role in 
the Darfur Conflict. However, the greatest issue has been due to the civil war between the 
North and South Sudan.  
The civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan has deep historical roots. 
Divided into two civil war periods, the conflict has displaced over 4 million people and 
killed some 1.9 million.44 Initial hostilities (1955-1972) began with the withdrawal of the 
British as the seat of government moved from Cairo to Khartoum. The elite English 
speaking Southerners resented speaking Arabic in order to engage with the government 
and sought more individual and cultural representation. The Addis Ababa Accords ended 
the first conflict, which gave more internal autonomy to Southern Sudan. 
In 1983, the Northern government declared a state of emergency to ensure that 
Shari’a law was enacted throughout the whole country, providing the spark that ignited 
the second civil war. Southerners are mainly Christian or an Animist tradition, and 
resented being ruled by Muslim law, and armed themselves to convince the Northern 
government to preserve their way of life. John Garang de Mabior led the SPLA (Sudan’s 
People Liberation Army) into battle to secure Southern Sudan’s autonomy, that lead to 
the SPLA controlling most of Southern Sudan (Equatorial, Upper Nile, Juba, and Wau). 
The militia-style war continued through the 1980s and 1990s, through the famines and 
economic strife. Despite the commitment to overthrow the northern government, the 
South still suffered from fractionalization of its militias, which were finally united in 
1993. After a series of six agreements on security, wealth and power sharing, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on January 9, 2005 between the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
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(SPLM/A). This, in theory, ended the conflict and lent some freedom to Southern Sudan 
through the creation of the Government of National Unity. 
After almost 60 years of fighting, the CPA has set the stage for a transitional 
period of peace between the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan. The basic tenets of 
the Agreement stipulate the absorption of troops into a unified army, a referendum to 
determine the future of South Sudan in 2011, and the fair division of oil revenue and 
reserves.45 The agreement is currently being contested as the northern Sudanese 
government has missed key deadlines for withdrawing its troops from the South. As of 
July 2007, there were still approximately 9,000 northern troops, mainly located in oil-
producing areas that had yet to be redeployed.46  
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005 has also failed to usher in 
the promised aid and rehabilitation to Southern Sudan. With a population of over 8 
million people, and as few as 30 doctors serving them, a 24% literacy rate, and a life 
expectancy of only 42 years, the amelioration of living standards may be the only factor 
considered by the voters of Southern Sudan in the fast-approaching sovereignty 
referendum scheduled in 2011.47 
 The Southern Sudanese government has one of the greatest governance challenges 
facing any nation in Africa. The social concerns and cultural links have tested the 
government from its infancy. As Sudan was essentially created through colonial ties, 
Southern Sudan’s cultural, environmental, historical, and ethnic links more closely 
                                               
45 “The Implementation and Modalities of the Power sharing,” Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
(Khartoum Sudan: December 31, 2004) 55. 
46 Amber Henshaw, “Sudan Misses Withdrawal Deadline,” BBC News, July 9, 2007, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6284894.stm>. 
47 Stephanie Nolen, “They Want to Give Peace a Chance,” Globe and Mail, October 22, 2005  
<www.globeandmail.com> (Retrieved October 22, 2005) 
 18 
resemble Uganda and Kenya, making the Southern State seem like a completely different 
country than Northern Sudan. A unique visa is even needed to enter and exit the lush and 
tropical Southern Sudan, which holds the majority of oil-producing areas of Sudan. 
Southern Sudan is governed by a distinct set of laws compared to the North, which uses 
Shari’a law to maintain law and order, while the South fought for independence from 
these laws and now follows the British model of law. Since a tragic helicopter crash 
ended the life of John Garang, former leader of the SPLA and charismatic vice president 
of Sudan, rumours have persisted since his death, implicating the Northern government. 
As a result, these issues have created speculation that another civil war may be brewing, 
especially over the disputed central oil-producing regions. 
War and conflict have ravaged Sudan for decades, and seem determined to 
continue for many years to come.48 Sadly, another conflict rages in Darfur, disrupting the 
possibility for peace in the country. Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan labelled the Darfurian conflict as the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world”49 
and Human Rights Watch maintains that the government is carrying out a campaign of 
“ethnic cleansing,” promoted with the use of armed militias in the Darfur area.50 With 
over 15,000 aid workers (1,000 from abroad), Darfur is also currently the world’s largest 
humanitarian effort.51 However, the recent intensification of fighting between warring 
factions and the deaths of over a dozen aid workers has prompted aid agencies to 
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withdraw from some areas and in some cases from the entire theatre. The Sudanese 
government has historically shown great opposition to a U.N. peacekeeping mission for 
Darfur, warning that it would consider any country's pledge to supply police or troops to 
a U.N. force "a hostile act" and a "prelude to an invasion".52 The government has bowed 
to international pressure with some concessions, committing to the deployment of 26,000 
soldiers to Darfur. This makes it the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world.53 The 
mission was criticized by observers from the beginning, who described it as ‘toothless’ in 
that the UN force does not have the power to confiscate weapons, nor shoot when under 
fire - all this in an area the size of France. As part of the concession with the government 
of Sudan, all troops must be African, which to date, has guaranteed that the forces are 
small, ill-equipped, and inadequate to complete the mission. 
Plagued by extreme weather producing droughts and flooding, an underlying source 
of conflict exists in the area due to its physical environment. Bordered by some of the 
world’s most unstable countries, Sudan is in conflict with each of them in some manner 
or another. These countries include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, Libya, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Uganda, and Kenya. Southern Sudan’s 
climate is tropical and lush, it holds most of the 6.78% of arable land in Sudan and 
obtains over 900mm of rain annually.54,55 Whereas 30% of northern Sudan is covered by 
desert, and obtains an average of only 50mm of rain annually, it has the advantage of 
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access to 750 kms of Red Sea coastline.56 The great link between the North and the South 
is the Nile River that courses the length of Sudan. 
Shockingly, despite a paucity of arable land, over 80% of the population depends on 
agriculture for employment; they grow cotton, oil seeds, gum arabic, sugar, and raise 
livestock, which are the main exports. Sudan maintains one of the fastest growing GDPs 
in Africa, which increased by 10% at the end of 2007.57 The economic Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund stemmed 
economic progress in much of the rest of Africa, but were only briefly implemented in 
Sudan during the period of 1978-1985. Even so, these stabilization and structural 
adjustment programmes have had an enduring influence on the economy. The relatively 
short implementation period promoted the devaluation of Sudanese currency, 
liberalization of foreign trade, the raising of taxes, and the liquidation of all state-owned 
manufacturing.58 By 1986, the relationship between the International Monetary Fund and 
Sudan became strained as the government failed to repay its debts, which eventually led 
to Sudan losing its voting rights in the institution. Despite the withdrawal of the IMF, the 
policy recommendations affect the country’s economic performance to this day. Barring 
oil revenues, there has been a decline in the annual rate of exports, an accumulation of 
foreign debt, as well as an increase in the proportion of people considered to live below 
the nutrition-based poverty line.59 
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Without doubt, the current economy and most of the country’s conflicts have been 
powered by oil. With so little arable land, Sudan’s economy depends mostly on oil 
exports. In fact, the Southern Sudan government relies entirely on oil revenue transfers in 
order to sustain its reconstruction efforts. The country is presently awash in oil dollars, 
enjoying investments from the Middle East, China, and Malaysia. During the civil war, 
the oil fields were a constant source of tension, as oil companies armed their own militias 
to protect their assets and allowed governmental military operations to use company 
airfields. Numerous international oil companies have entered Sudan to exploit the almost 
85 billion cu/m of natural gas reserves.60 Most analysts agree that it is the distribution of 
oil profits that will determine the results of the 2011 sovereignty referendum.61  
Despite these resources, Sudan’s conflicts and famines have always been front-
page news internationally. Gaining popularity from celebrities such as Michael Jackson, 
the Ethiopian Famine of the 1980’s was the catalyst for increased funding for aid to 
NGOs willing to help in the region and join the now famous Operation Life Line. NGOs 
moved quickly to Sudan mainly in the Southern states and Khartoum, where hundreds of 
thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) migrated to escape the devastating 
famine and war. This instability continued throughout the 1980s and into the present, and 
now, a chronic lack of basic services has created a dependency on NGOs for daily 
subsistence, including food aid, employment, and provision of water and health services.  
 
 
                                               
60“Sudan” CIA Fact Book.  
61 Southern Leader Salva Kiir has been warning Southerners to “be ready for anything” as rumours of 
bribery flowed through Juba, that claimed Northerners were beginning to bribe them ahead of the 
referendum. Skye Wheeler, “Southern Sudan says Concerned over Referendum,” Reuters, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSL2621595._CH_.2400> (Retrieved January 8, 2008). 
 22 
The International Rescue Committee 
The IRC has been quick to respond to emergencies in Sudan, and they often prove 
more effective in reacting to crises than the government, with results based management 
programmes and realistic projects. Initially founded in 1933, the International Rescue 
Committee is an international NGO that works in twenty-five countries worldwide. The 
predecessor to the IRC, the International Relief Association (IRA) was created through 
the encouragement of Albert Einstein to combat the rise of communism by smuggling out 
of communist countries as many Jewish leaders as possible through financial and travel 
assistance.62,63 Since these modest beginnings the International Rescue Committee has 
been providing relief and aid to millions of refugees around the world. The organisation 
grew exponentially to a total annual world budget of over $203,573,298 in 2005, - up 
from $78,000,000 in 1997 and $26,913,425 in 1980.64 IRC’s services touch every corner 
of the globe, including Indonesia, Chad, and Lebanon. As the IRC is without any ethnic, 
religious or democratic credo; it has been able to work in areas that governments could 
not, and to work with both governments and intergovernmental programmes.65 Money 
Magazine consistently notes IRC as being one of the most efficient relief and 
development charities and Smart Money describes the IRC as being the leader of 
agencies in international relief.66 Pete Rose of Harvard University, foremost scholar on 
refugee affairs stated, “The IRC is the model refugee agency and a remarkable symbol of 
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single-minded dedication to aiding those opposed by dictatorship on the right or the 
left.”67 
IRC’s expansion into Africa came in 1962, when 200,000 refugees fled from 
Angola to Zaire.68 However, it was not until 1981 that the IRC began its Sudan mission, 
providing humanitarian relief and rehabilitation during the great Sahel famine. In 1984, 
the organisation stepped in to help refugees flooding in from the Eritrean and Ethiopian 
conflict and by 1985, the IRC had grown to over 100 expatriate staff and a 2,000 national 
staff refugee-managed programme that included a broad spectrum of aid: medical, public 
health, immigration, childcare, emergency feeding, and intensive refugee training.69 
IRC Sudan’s current long-term goal is “to improve Sudanese people’s ability to 
exercise their fundamental rights, access to basic services, and manage their own 
livelihoods, while enabling individuals and communities to work towards accountable 
governance, stability, and security through an active civil society.”70 The country 
programme, administrated from New York and London, is project-supported by a wide 
variety of donors including CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), 
UNICEF, United States Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Japanese 
Embassy Khartoum, plus a myriad of private foundations (e.g., Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, American Express Foundation).71 Over 2.2 million people depend on the 
International Rescue Committee’s services, including 880,000 Darfurians.72 IRC’s 
operations in Sudan are divided into three regions of Sudan, the North East (Red Sea and 
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Kassala State), West Sudan (Darfur - North, South, West States), and Southern Sudan 
(Juba, Nuba Mountains).73 Currently, the programme consists of large-scale emergency 
responses in Darfur, and longer-term reconstruction efforts elsewhere, especially for the 
expected tens of thousands of returnees. IRC’s development assistance is classified into 
six sub categories: multi-sector relief and development; civil society development; human 
rights, peace building and protection; reproductive and primary health; economic 
development; and agricultural development.74 
The United Nations estimates that there are over four million Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDP) in Sudan, with hundreds of thousands more living abroad.75 These 
troubling figures have led to an increase of international pressure, as the international 
community has been eager to end the Southern civil wars’ effects, as well as the 
Darfurian instability. The strain caused by this scrutiny to ensure safe passage for the 
returnees has given the Sudanese government reason to believe that the NGOs are the 
eyes and ears of the developed world. As a result, the relationship between Sudan and the 
international community is unstable at best, and antagonistic at worst. 
Clashes Between NGOs and the Government 
The growing pressure to maintain both short-term humanitarian relief and long-
term community development has created a strain on the Sudan country programme. The 
unique management styles that are needed to effectively manage dual-programmes 
located in every corner of the country are certainly not without their problems. The 
government of Sudan attempts to aid in this management through a specialized 
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government ministry and by creating numerous laws and policies that oversee the actions 
of NGOs. The process of moving NGOs under the umbrella of the government has 
produced a dual-role for NGOs in the process: using NGOs as an entity of the State while 
attempting to keep their role as advocates for the beneficiaries they represent separate. 
Since the Romans, the study of politics and international development has tended 
to view governance in a hierarchical manner, with the government administration at the 
top of the pyramid, moving to government offices, businesses, civil society, and then the 
general public (voters) at the base.76 However, that description is not representative of the 
governance hierarchy of Sudan, where there are many strata of government and unique 
variations of control. The government is involved through over-regulation in all areas, 
including civil society and especially international NGOs. The Sudanese government is 
certainly at the top of the pyramid, however, there is a strong level of intermediate 
control of all levels of governance. Most, if not all government offices have a high degree 
of secrecy and suspicion. Regulating NGOs is done through a specifically mandated 
branch - the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (HAC). 
Access by the NGO community to any form of labour (both international and 
local) is severely restricted and marred by unnecessary or arbitrary bureaucratic red tape. 
There are even reports and office whispers of government spies within the NGOs. This 
red tape and suspicion has led to high ‘administration costs’ levied on NGOs for nearly 
everything, from visas to enter, exit, and travel within the country, to human resources 
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matters such as hiring and firing decisions. The Humanitarian Aid Commission is a 
Ministry of the Sudanese government that supervises and monitors the work of all 
development agencies. The HAC has been known to withhold travel visas for both 
international and national aid workers, allegedly spy on employees, arbitrarily apply 
import and export rules and regulations for relief materials, and create new bureaucratic 
procedures in its effort to subdue the power and authority of international development 
agencies. 77 Essentially, the government controls who is hired and fired in all NGOs, 
dictates what freedom the organisations have to act, and can even ‘suggest’ which area of 
the country is to receive aid. The implications of this can be both profound and 
conflicting. On the one hand, it is important for the government to know the operational 
plans of NGOs in order to arrange for services for the country and to hold them 
accountable. Conversely, in emergency and conflict situations, the government may not 
be the best conduit for determining aid provision.  This is especially true of the Sudanese 
government, which has been known to use aid for corrupt political gain such as 
distribution to strategic voting areas, military supporters, or outright confiscation. 
The exact administration costs for NGOs such as the IRC by the Humanitarian 
Aid Commission can be quite high. The bureaucratic process is lengthy, involving 
numerous and unnecessary steps, requiring at least one staff member to wait and process 
documents as well as another to liaise with the ministry. This, combined with the costs of 
processing the documents by HAC, can mean a substantial loss to NGOs in terms of 
money and time. Unfortunately, budgets for individual programmes are not available to 
the public. However, interviewees estimated that between $40,000USD and 
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$100,000USD is spent per year by IRC Sudan in administrative costs, ‘greasing wheels’, 
costs of delay and processing basic documents at HAC.78 These expenses do not include 
the salaries of at least two local administration staff whose only job is to process visas for 
expatriates, and manage national staff hiring, and navigate the opaque labour laws with 
the Humanitarian Aid Commission. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) Sudan released a report in April 2006 estimating that international 
NGOs spent over $380,000 USD on visas for the Darfur region alone.79 The report 
detailed numerous concerns found with HAC, such as unclear and arbitrary procedures, 
delays in obtaining visas, as well as black-out periods, as when no visas were processed 
for the entire month of March (2007).80 
The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) is the Southern 
counterpart to the Humanitarian Aid Commission. Based in Nairobi Kenya, the SRRA is 
the main driver of all NGO activities in the South, whose funding historically came from 
the SPLM, and now works with the Southern government. The organisation coordinates 
all aid in the South, ensuring equitable division of the services and goods. The SRRA 
gave land to those NGOs willing to set up offices in Juba. Unfortunately the land was 
riddled with land mines, which needed to be cleared before building commenced. In 
many respects, the SRRA functions similarly to the HAC; however, the obstructionist 
bureaucratic nature is neither prevalent nor widespread as the SRRC is still a small 
system. However, as the country moves to amalgamation, HAC and SRRC have been 
setting up blended offices in the transitional areas. 
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The government of Sudan is not known for its accountability mechanisms or 
transparency, and at times has the tendency to understate issues in order to save face on 
the international scene. Through HAC, the government attempts to quell any information 
that it finds unsavoury. For years the al-Bashir government has been claiming that Darfur 
is not a humanitarian disaster. The president instead asserts that Darfur is “secure and 
enjoying real peace” and that “people are living normal lives.”81 In August 2006, the IRC 
released a report attempting to dispel this propaganda, stating that over 200 women had 
been raped in the previous five weeks in Kalma Camp, Darfur - some as young as 
thirteen years old.82 This was in direct contradiction to the government of Sudan’s stance, 
which claimed sexual abuse in the Darfur region to be a rare occurrence.83 The 
Humanitarian Aid Commission quickly put a halt to all visas in, out, and within the 
country to IRC aid workers, while the government demanded the case files of all abused 
women so that they could be ‘questioned.’84 The visas resumed to IRC staff after a few 
weeks, but interviewees claim that the relationship between the IRC and the government 
of Sudan continues to be strained. 
IRC is not the only organisation that has faced these sanctions from the 
Humanitarian Aid Commission. In April 2006, HAC demanded that the Norwegian 
Refugee Council remove itself from Nyela, South Darfur. No reason was given, and their 
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removal left 94,000 people in Kalma Camp without a camp manager.85 Additionally, the 
Women's Awareness Raising Group (AWOON), a national NGO, had all their assets 
frozen after receiving money from the European Economic Union. Between 2004 and 
2005 at least 20 international NGO staff members were arrested for various charges of 
dubious merit.86 
Presented initially in February 2006, the Organisation of Humanitarian and 
Voluntary Work Act gained attention due to the restrictive policies, freedom of 
association and increased centralization of NGO activities by the HAC. The Act is vague, 
giving ambiguity to the commission, especially with policy statements for NGOs to 
“comply with any other conditions to be laid down by the Minister.”87 Moreover, under 
this act all national and international NGOs are required to gain permission from HAC to 
obtain money from international sources.88 As an example, a national NGO, Women's 
Awareness Raising Group (AWOON), which specialized in women’s human rights 
issues, ran afoul of HAC, as their funding from the EU was not registered at the Ministry, 
despite the fact that the proposal was submitted to the EU far before the Act was even in 
place. The government of Sudan seized all their assets, and has denied AWOON access 
to all NGO meetings, including appointments with the United Nations Development 
Fund.89 In yet another incident, the Humanitarian Aid Commission Office publicly posted 
a report in Darfur in which NGOs were ranked arbitrarily as "perfect," "middle," "weak" 
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or "dismissed."90 In total, 58 NGOs were "dismissed" and an additional 48 NGOs were 
singled out for further evaluation or restructuring. 91 
For NGOs working in Sudan, the Organisation of Humanitarian and Voluntary 
Work Act of 2006 has become a strong presence in their everyday operations. In 
particular Section 5 (f) requires “non-interference by foreign and national organizations 
in the internal affairs of the Sudan, to the extent that these infringe upon the sovereignty 
of the country”.92 International interference is a regular government excuse for restricting 
NGOs that work in sensitive regions from speaking out about human rights violations 
they witness on the ground. 93 This is especially true for NGOs in Darfur. 
A Medecins Sans Frontieres aid worker commented, “Even though insecurity is a 
factor limiting our access, bureaucratic obstacles imposed by the government of Sudan 
are also a critical factor in limiting the access we have.”94 This bureaucratic red tape has 
impeded NGOs operations, despite pressure from the US government and other 
international agencies. To work around the staff deficiencies, the IRC was working 
without key management players and in limited project areas. 
Conversely, any NGO that forges too tight a partnership with the Humanitarian Aid 
Commission risks weakening their legitimacy and accountability with the community 
they serve as well as to the donors. Increasing the bureaucratic steps needed to secure 
funding means that international NGOs like IRC cannot sustain their current operations, 
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as support is often time restricted. A barely democratic government can manipulate and 
prescribe project areas and beneficiaries. Ultimately NGOs focus on filling gaps that the 
government cannot or will not fill. They operate within the sphere of the government 
hierarchy, becoming essentially an arm of the State with greater or lesser operational 
independence. Depending on one’s point of view, they can be seen as either puppets or 
autonomous entities – the reality is that they are somewhere on the spectrum between 
these two poles, trying to find room to manoeuvre. 
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CHAPTER THREE: IRC Policies and Critique 
 
 
Despite growing resentment by the Sudanese government, the International 
Rescue Committee has thrived in its project areas, focusing as it does on security, camp 
management, health care, and water and sanitation. This chapter will examine the 
mandate of the IRC to promote good governance in the country and the policies in place 
to further these goals. As we will see, IRC’s lack of accountable policies in their 
operations has undermined their mandate for the promotion of good governance. We will 
also discuss the two distinct avenues by which good governance affects the IRC, the State 
and beneficiaries, and how NGOs in general fill many of the roles left open by failed 
states or governments in crisis. 
The attempted cooptation of the IRC within the State apparatus, presents a 
difficult challenge for the concepts of good governance and accountability. Two factors 
have illuminated the concept of good governance of NGOs and government in the public 
eye. Firstly, beginning in the late 1980s, Western governments moved several publicly 
funded services into the not-for-profit sphere through grant-making. This is particularly 
true in the international development field, as governments moved bilateral transfer 
funding to NGOs to promote foreign aid, expanding the number and role of NGOs in the 
process. Secondly and concurrently, good governance became the conceptual measure 
that donor agencies would use to determine if the client governments and not-for-profits 
were able to obtain funding. This yardstick is steadily lengthening, as expectations of 
quantifiable results grow over time. The application of these governance standards is 
usually catalyzed by scandals or irregularities, with donors and the populace insisting on 
a more effective and useful government and NGOs. The cumulative effect of this drive 
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for governance has meant that NGOs now take on a growing role in society as an 
advocate and as a service provider. 
Good governance, as discussed in Chapter One, has become a catch phrase in the 
new millennium for ensuring that NGOs and governments are more transparent and 
accountable. Accountability is crucial for NGOs, as they depend mostly on their 
reputation on which to base their actions.95 NGOs are accountable in a hierarchy upwards 
to their trustees, donors, and boards of directors, and downwards to their partners, 
beneficiaries, staff, and supporters.96 In the past, NGOs accountability has been shown 
through a number of different means including financial reports released to the public, 
annual reports highlighting results and lessons learned, as well as the mechanisms for 
funding. However, as the public becomes more disenchanted with the effectiveness of 
NGO aid in emergencies, these organisations have begun to promote a standardization of 
good governance policies as a way to subdue public apathy and disengagement. These 
standards are somewhat opaque as there is very little consensus as to how this should be 
done and how much accountability is needed to appease public perception and still be 
effective. 
Many NGOs have recognized the perception of a lack of transparency in their 
operations, and have attempted to combat it through a number of different measures. For 
instance, the Ugandan Quality Assurance Program of 2005, was designed to promote and 
create generally acceptable ethical standards and operational norms for NGOs. 97 The 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership of Geneva (HAP) has also created a base set of 
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standards of responsibility for NGOs to ensure efficacy through good governance. These 
involve a strong board of directors, mission and strategic planning, a sound organisational 
structure, a focus on transparency, and independent monitoring and evaluation. 
Nevertheless, it will be some time before the majority of NGOs and the public recognize 
a base set of standards to further good governance. 
The unique juxtaposition between an NGO’s and a government’s role in 
promoting good governance is found in their raisons d’etres. On the one hand, the State 
is responsible for mandated obligations to its society, whereas NGOs do not have a 
specific objective defined by others - they are essentially free agents with vague 
operational statements such as “Canadians Challenging Global Poverty”98 or “Non-profit 
organisation helping impoverished and malnourished children around the world.”99 There 
is very little distinction between the two organisational statements: both hope to 
challenge poverty, and help those in need. If one was to look more closely at the two 
organisations, the extent to which these goals are accomplished is vastly different. This 
can also be said for the management of a populace in the case of government, as there are 
varying ways to undertake administration. There is one key difference between 
democratic governments and NGOs: NGOs are not elected. NGOs are not representative, 
nor necessarily accountable to their clients. Their resource pool is voluntary and limited. 
The State, conversely, has a territorial link to its people. The State may not be 
representative or even elected; nevertheless there is a fundamental link to land and its 
resources that bonds them to voters/beneficiaries. This moral obligation of governments 
separates them from civil society and society at large. 
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In a collapsed, ineffective, or uncooperative government setting, the State 
abrogates some of its responsibilities to its populace, which can have detrimental effects 
on the population. Where this occurs, NGOs and civil society shift into the roles normally 
taken by the State, such as supplying water and sanitation, providing health care, or even 
holding democratic elections to establish community leadership. The specific roles and 
function of the State are certainly debatable, and will not be discussed in detail here. It is 
sufficient for our purpose to note that the State, in theory, encompasses all functions of 
governance as defined by the UN, including rule of law, providing security, and basic 
human rights such as the rights to life, procreation, education, and health. 
The IRC does provide all of those services in some manner or another. However, 
the question remains, can the IRC succeed within an uncooperative State? In short, the 
response is a simple yes, however, NGOs will not function as effectively. In collapsed 
States or emergency situations, governments have the tendency to withdraw from some 
areas of service, either strategically or due to a breakdown in mechanisms or monetary or 
environmental constraints. For instance, in Southern Sudan, the Northern government 
used aid as a strategic weapon of war, denying food aid to the Southern rebel-friendly 
areas. After the Asian Tsunami of 2004, strong governments were unable to cope 
logistically and economically with such a great calamity, such that other agencies and 
governments were called upon to help. NGOs in those situations step in to fill as many 
roles of the State as possible, but in the case of Sudan, are bogged down in red tape from 
the Humanitarian Aid Commission. 
It is impossible for the IRC to work independently from the Sudanese government 
and its Ministries, however in an emergency, the NGO can join together, pulling 
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resources from unique sources to form a unique social net for the people of Sudan. The 
monetary constraints of the Sudanese government caused by decades of war, Structural 
Adjustment Programmes in the 1980’s, and natural disasters left much of the 
development of infrastructure, especially in Darfur and Southern Sudan, to the NGOs and 
private corporations. In fact, in several different project areas, the IRC has been more 
successful in providing education and health care than the government.100 
As international institutions and large funders like USAID move towards funding 
projects that encourage ‘good governance’, NGOs have followed in an attempt to capture 
grants. Good governance has become a matter of critical importance for the IRC-Sudan 
programme, and IRC in general. Its new IRC-New York programme framework is a 
reflection of those trends, being defined as one of three core programme areas. IRC has 
also recently created the “Governance and Rights Unit,” which is tasked with providing 
technical aid to all country programmes that focus on rule of law, civil society 
development, and community driven reconstruction.101 IRC-Sudan’s current long-term 
mandate focuses on this trend to “work towards accountable governance, stability, and 
security through an active civil society.”102 Hence, the organisation is committed to 
leaving behind a viable community. Their correspondence for the overall world 
programme includes the statement “The International Rescue Committee is a global 
leader in relief, rehabilitation, post-conflict development, advocacy and resettlement 
services for refugees and others uprooted or affected by violent conflict and 
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oppression.”103 However, its policies do not seem to back up the claim of “global 
leadership”, as the IRC field manual is almost completely devoid of any information 
concerning the roles of NGO workers and governance, or responsibilities of NGO 
workers on this front. One is challenged to find in any of the IRCs policy literature 
mention of how the IRC relates to the federal or local governments, or even to other 
NGOs. In spite of this lack of policy, IRC-Sudan must still enact many civil society 
empowerment and rule-of-law projects, frequently interrelating with the government and 
other organisations in the execution of their work. 
Oddly, for an organisation whose mandate specifically includes the promotion of 
good governance and civil society, employees were not briefed to this effect. The 
interviewees questioned noted that building of civil society and governance was not high 
on the agenda and questioned the ability of IRC to promote this, as the “organisation does 
not have an accountable organisational network”.104 The IRC-Sudan programme has been 
called a ‘pup tent’ relief organisation, which is a field metaphor for an NGO that quickly 
arrives in a crisis, begins providing lifesaving services, but can depart just as quickly 
when the crisis and funding starts to wane. To date, the IRC has been active in the Sudan 
for 28 years. As we will see in the examination of their projects, the organisation 
genuinely strives to bring some stability to the area, but lacks long-term planning. 
IRC’s projects are as diverse as the country itself. In the South, the projects focus 
on women’s empowerment, water and sanitation, while in Eastern Sudan the projects 
involve building emergency shelters and drilling wells. The Darfur programme is 
currently the most complex and protracted, with a full spectrum of services offered: 
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education, health, water and sanitation and camp management. Most interviewees noted 
that IRC Sudan is very strong in providing quick and immediate humanitarian assistance 
in emergency situations, but sometimes lacks follow-through with long-term relief such 
as micro-credit, capacity building, and empowerment projects. We will examine three 
project areas that specifically touch upon the building of civil society and development of 
good governance: camp management, rule of law, and health and infrastructure. These 
projects will underline the chief importance of IRC Sudan in the area of good governance 
in Sudan. 
IRC has been working in Darfur as a large mission for just over a decade, aiding over 
880,000 Darfurians in 2004-2005 alone.105 The programme currently runs nutrition, 
sanitation, and health projects for 250,000 people in Abu Shouk and Kassab Camps in 
North Darfur as well as in Kalma and Kass Camps in South Darfur.106 In that time the 
organisation has become the camp organiser (official title Camp Managers) in many of 
their project areas, in charge of coordination of all aid that is destined to their areas of 
operation. In 2005-2006 USAID sent $35 million dollars (US) to Darfur, of which IRC 
received $8,800,000.107 This money is used for coordination of camps, health promotion, 
protection, water and sanitation, and hygiene promotion in South and West Darfur. An 
excited IRC employee noted on my arrival, “I have never seen something happen in the 
field so quickly - within two weeks we had a functioning hospital! It was really quite 
beautiful to see.”108 The conditions in these camps are relatively good, 39% of the 
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children still suffer from malnutrition, and there have been many outbreaks of refugee 
camp health issues such as hepatitis and measles.109 Without the actions of the IRC and 
other NGOs, this relief would not have come to Darfur, which has been historically 
neglected by the Khartoum government. 
In the remote northeastern province of Kassala, in former SPLM held areas, the IRC 
provided 97% of all health care for the region in 2004.110 Predominantly Eritrean 
refugees who fled the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998 have depended on the 
kindness of NGOs for their survival. There is certainly no question that the organisation 
has been instrumental in the creation of effective health infrastructure in Kassala and 
throughout most of Sudan. Community mid-wife programmes have produced a drop in 
infant mortality in Kassala, as girls and boys are able to see an IRC trained health worker 
for a reasonable price in their village, and women have access to hygiene promoting non-
food items such as buckets and soap. 
Another important aspect of IRC’s work involves human rights, peace building and 
protection of beneficiaries. This significant component of IRC’s work began in 2005 
when it embarked on a tri-phase project targeting youth in the entire country, which was 
sponsored by CIDA. The project worked with individual youths and youth groups, 
providing successful conflict mediation and peace-building activities at the local and 
governmental level. IRC received a grant of $471,000 (Cdn.) from the much-coveted 
Canadian government Peace-Building Fund to continue the project, whose main focus is 
the engagement of Sudanese youth.111 As many youth have been affected by exploitation, 
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displacement and the disruption or absence of education, this initiative aims to improve 
the capacity of Sudanese youth to become engaged in their communities through youth 
centres that provide education and even micro loans to develop skills or businesses.112 It 
is an important project that has been further augmented with the training of community 
human rights advisors, as well as human rights training of political and military officials. 
Government officials who took the training claimed that prior to the training they lacked 
adequate background on Sudanese and international laws, and felt they benefited greatly 
from their improved awareness. Whether the information gained by the government 
officials is used in its administration to make its processes more equitable is still yet 
unknown. The fact remains that an individual base knowledge of human rights is the first 
step in promoting organisational good governance. 
With this dedication to human rights and rule of law, IRC has paved the way for 
many Darfurians learning about and gaining these rights for the first time. One of the 
more unconventional roles of IRC that has emerged in the last few years has been its 
central role of management of refugee/IDP camps. IRC is expected by donors to use a 
community participation model to involve communities in the implementation of 
programmes. This links NGOs with community councils or village leaders to ensure 
active participation in projects. In times of strife and population migration, NGOs will 
hold democratic elections to ‘elect’ a community council or set of leaders. It is important 
to note that these elections are usually held in refugee/IDP camps where people from 
different villages, tribes, languages and regions amalgamate. Sometimes, this may be the 
first time people are voting to select their leaders, as many people in Sudan have never 
been involved in the State’s own weak democratic process. Women in particular have 
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been marginalized from this process, and NGOs encourage them to be part of the 
leadership, however, in a male dominated society, despite NGO advocacy, women’s 
voices are often lost. 
The IRC is currently in charge of the management of the Zalingei refugee camp, 
South Darfur, where an estimated 95,000 displaced people currently reside.113 This 
management entails the monitoring of conditions and “coordination of humanitarian 
activities inside the camp to address needs…and ensure site maintenance and 
planning.”114 In el Fasher, North Sudan, the IRC organises all relief activities that are 
concentrated in three IDP camps in the El Fasher locality (As Salaam, Abu Shouk and 
Zam Zam) and serves over 200,000 beneficiaries.115 This involves the coordination and 
mediation of all NGOs in the region, the police, military, rebel, and community leaders. 
This massive undertaking is likened to the management of municipalities, as the IRC 
coordinates all water and sanitation, education, health, gender-based violence services, 
and training of police within the camps. 
As NGOs manage the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens, there is an 
obvious set of regulations to which they must adhere. IRC, for its large role, does not 
have any policies in place for dealing with officials, the government of Sudan, and the 
official governance of camps. Surprisingly, the IRC Sudan programme does not provide 
education or policy direction to staff regarding government or even politically related 
issues. Nor is governance preparation listed in the training guide for all international or 
national staff. Since many staff, especially those in the field, interact with government on 
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a daily basis, training and guidelines would be an important step in creating stronger ties, 
and perhaps a more amicable and efficient environment in which to work. 
In terms of policies to guide their actions, employees are only instructed to adhere to 
blanket NGO policies that include the Sphere Standards reference guide for minimum 
standards in disaster response, the Red Cross Standards, and donor standards. IRC-Sudan 
does not have policies or a procedure manual for negotiating with the government of 
Sudan, local governments, or the militias, despite the fact that these are undertaken 
regularly as an inevitable part of working in the field. All interviewees noted a lack of 
direction from administration in regards to this area, and a general need for them. Staff 
noted a ‘reinventing the wheel’ phenomenon that happens with every staff changeover, as 
new staff must learn the optimal manner to negotiate with government and local powers. 
This lack of protocol in dealing with any incidences regarding the police and government 
is certainly to the detriment of the safety and security of IRC Sudan’s staff as well as the 
efficiency of their work. 
The Sphere Project, initiated in 1997, is at the forefront of reference guides for NGOs 
and donors alike for specific targets of minimum standards in an emergency. It is a self-
proclaimed “human rights charter and minimum standards in disaster response.”116 NGOs 
were determined to have quantifiable and attainable outcomes for programmes, and 
developed a core set of standards that set the minimum level of humanitarian aid that 
ensures human well being and dignity. Sphere Standards have become the minimum bar 
to which all NGOs and their projects can be measured against. However, very few of the 
standards have any guidelines related to governance that would direct employees. The 
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handbook contains directives only for standards of minimum needs for human survival, 
and not necessarily those needed to fulfill basic human rights. These include protection, 
water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion, food security, nutrition, and food aid, 
shelter, and health services.117 Despite the fact that protection is a major focus of 
humanitarian assistance, the Sphere Standards only acknowledge its importance, leaving 
the protection strategies or policies to the individual agencies to create. 
The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross Movement and Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief is also part of the curriculum for 
all new staff of IRC. Developed in 1994, and agreed upon by eight of the world's largest 
disaster response agencies, these codes attempt to guard NGOs’ standards of behaviour 
and “seeks to maintain high standards of independence, effectiveness and impact to 
disaster response.”118 These codes of conduct are comprised of the concepts of 
governance, such as never using aid to further a particular political or religious standpoint 
or endeavouring not to act as instruments of government foreign policy, this again does 
not include specifics for NGO employees to engage with governments regarding these 
issues. The Code of Conduct number 4 states that “[W]e shall endeavour not to act as 
instruments of government foreign policy.”119 Instead, this complex relationship between 
the field offices, the local government, and local rebel groups is left to the ‘people on the 
ground’ to exercise their judgement. 
Another type of training used by the IRC-Sudan programme comes directly from 
donors and donor governments. In the case of IRC’s largest funder, USAID, stipulations 
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in the contract include using medications that come from the United States, flying US 
airlines as much as possible, using the USAID brand, as well as the promotion of 
abstinence as the first line of defence from HIV.120,121The contracts also note the intent of 
the projects, such as the improvement of water and sanitation, and the creation of a civil 
society group. However, the process in which these tasks are carried out is often left to 
the discretion of the NGO. When the intent is to promote good governance, there is little 
guidance given, despite the strong democratic rhetoric of the United States government in 
this area. 
The European Union’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) functions similarly to 
USAID, though with much less religiously motivated policy.122The thrust of the ECHO 
Aid Strategy document, released in 2004, points out the need for a strong link between 
relief, rehabilitation and development, paying specific attention to ‘forgotten crises and 
forgotten needs.”123 Its mission in Sudan involves the coordination of humanitarian 
assistance through partner organisations, focusing on health, nutrition, water and 
sanitation, and food security. A significant amount of ECHO’s Sudanese aid is filtered 
through the International Rescue Committee. In fact, between March and October 2005, 
$2,909,938 USD was provided to IRC for its projects.124 Despite ECHO’s strong 
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presence in Sudan, its focus on basic needs does not lend any policy guides to those 
employees whose mandate it is to uphold a good goverance related agreement. 
Donor standards vary from government to government and charity to charity. Some 
donors such as ECHO require extensive auditing and financial accountability. Others 
such as USAID require only the submission of vague budgets that include the sectors 
(fundraising, water and sanitation, non food items) where donor money was spent. These 
mixed standards cause confusion with many employees, with hours of time spent 
researching the donor requirements for reports and creating financial statements. This 
time could certainly be better used in the creation of countrywide policies and 
recommendations. 
Accountability to donors is also a serious weakness, as results-based project 
management tools require deadlines (to obtain funding) for donor reports and proposals 
upon which that funding is usually contingent. Results in the field are also difficult to 
quantify. Very little statistical research is undertaken by NGOs as a quality measurement 
for funders, as it would be incredibly costly to do. One memorable statement made by 
field staff from Darfur regarding the need for a health statistic for a donor report was, 
“Just make it up, that’s what we do.” This does not imply that all statistics are taken from 
thin air. The recent release of rape statistics by IRC, for instance, is taken from confirmed 
reports and carries significant validity, but that measurement is complex in nature. 
Furthermore assertions such as “the reduction of malaria cases by 20%” cannot be 
quantified and qualified without an in-depth and lengthy study. This research would 
involve taking into account such complexities as the enlargement or decline of the 
population of camps due to migration, weather, actions taken to reduce malaria, and other 
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organisations’ help. This is certainly not something that a project-funded, employee-
strapped organisation could undertake in any formal, objective manner. Therefore, some 
serious ‘estimation’ is undertaken for any results based management reports coming out 
of the field. 
The development community reasons backward in order to achieve desired outcomes. 
It sets ideal results, such as the Sphere Standards of “most amount of people with access 
to 15L/person/day of water,” and then attempts to achieve the desired goal. As the project 
proceeds there are results that must be achieved in order to meet the intended objectives. 
Often times, stated goals are over-exaggerated or sometimes impossible to quantify or 
measure. For instance, the IRC had a project whose goal was to improve the mental 
health of women in a refugee/IDP camp, but how can that be quantified? This could be an 
intended objective, however, it is impossible to quantify results without trained 
specialized professionals both before and after the project. In times of crisis or 
emergency, rapid assessment surveys may be carried out if the region is new to NGO 
support, which are rarely comprehensive and for the most part, these surveys are rarely 
carried out before project funding is obtained or earmarked. The short time frame for the 
development funding of projects, limits the ability for project coordinators to effectively 
analyze every issue in the community. 
Despite these weaknesses, the IRC has many unique features that make it an 
important actor in Sudan. NGOs have a number of strengths in their organisational 
structure that includes their ability to manoeuvre in difficult and ever-changing 
environments. As well, the ever-changing roles and conditions of funding have pushed 
the IRC into an advocacy position, functioning as a watchdog and policy advisor of 
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governments more than ever before. This does not imply that the projects and 
programmes that the IRC undertakes are not beneficial, but that their role has changed 
and their scope has expanded to include improving the host countries transparency and 
accountability. This is in parallel with their effort to kick-start long-term sustainable 
improvements in communities. 
Engaging with governments has become arguably the most important humanitarian 
aid component that the IRC and other NGOs have been undertaking. Some critics such as 
Helen Collinson accuse NGOs of attempting to co-opt government roles through the 
management of State responsibilities such as health care. 125 Instead, she prescribes 
increasing direct government budget support, which will improve the amount of 
resources passing through parliament’s authority. In Sudan, the strong resistance to 
NGOs from the Sudanese government, the growth of international media presence, 
combined with increased NGO funding for advocacy activities have enforced the need of 
NGOs to act as representatives for the community. The government of Sudan is known to 
understate facts and figures regarding the conflict and the social-economic circumstances 
of its citizens in order to save face on the international scene. 
When internal campaigning fails, often the IRC is called upon to campaign abroad for 
their beneficiaries. The organisation serves a long-term function of promoting greater 
transparency in the government in whose area they act. IRC’s watchdog ability despite 
government pressure, shows its capacity to work both with and against the government of 
Sudan. However, it is a constant struggle for IRC to strive for balance between calming 
the tension from the Humanitarian Aid Commission and assisting its beneficiaries. 
                                               
125 Collinson, 5. 
 48 
The lack of donor presence in the area, as well as loose project mandates gives the 
IRC flexibility to generally to act with few checks and balances, and act at a moment’s 
notice. NGOs are sometimes more able to respond to the needs of local populations with 
greater ease and flexibility than the State, as they generally have modest administration 
costs and limited but targeted resources, making the projects small scale in nature.126 As 
an example of this ability to manoeuvre, IRC was able to respond quickly to the acute 
outburst of jaundice syndrome (Hepatitis E) in Otash camp, South Darfur, mobilizing 
with CARE to provide countermeasures such as soap and hygiene promotion, as well as 
constructing more latrines that dispersed the threat.127 As well, project proposal changes 
can be generally made quite easily, following the guidelines of the donor agency. 
Therefore, if conditions change on the ground or demand for non-food items was less 
then the demand for shelters, the funds can be allocated to fill alternative needs. NGOs 
such as Doctors without Borders and Red Cross/Crescent have tonnes of emergency 
rations in shipping containers to be mobilized at a moments notice. States and 
bureaucratic institutions (and even some of the largest NGOs to some extent) often do not 
have that flexibility to change their focus mid-stream. 
This flexibility gives IRC the ability to go where governments and armies fear to 
tread. It is in these conflict situations where NGOs are needed most, and rely heavily on 
the Red Cross/Crescent movement for protection. Organisations and aid workers alike 
guard this neutrality heavily as it lends some assurance of safety. However, aid can never 
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be completely neutral. When an NGO chooses a targeted area to work, it instantly delves 
into the realm of the political. Once the territory of aid is set, the balancing act begins. 
In the Darfur region of Sudan, IRC’s neutrality is constantly tested with dozens of 
independent militia groups all employing different methods in order to be appeased so 
that aid can continue in their region. Despite setbacks in Darfur, such as the death of an 
outreach worker in Hasaba camp, North Darfur, the IRC continues to operate. This shield 
of impartiality is not perfect, however, as aid supplies have also recently become the 
targets of looting and vandalism and numerous vehicles have been hijacked or stolen. As 
one aid worker noted, “Since most of the villages have been burned, there is nothing left 
to loot except aid agencies.”128 This aid can be difficult to administer through 
negotiations with rebel groups and the government; in response, the IRC has had to 
reduce the scope of its operations in the highly volatile areas. 
With the reduction of its development and rehabilitation activities, IRC has seen a 
surge in its role as advocate for the people of Darfur and Sudan. This pressuring of 
governments to change policies and enforce them is a significant function of NGOs in 
general.129 Humanitarian organisations have a significant amount of sway at both the 
international and national levels, which certainly comes at a cost. NGOs must convince 
the national governments that their intentions are representative of the beneficiaries, and 
persuade the public that their goals are honourable and selfless.130 To this end, the IRC 
hired its first Advocacy Advisor on Sudan in 2006, whose role was to release advocacy 
papers, petition government and make recommendations to the government and United 
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Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). However, the challenge remains that NGOs must 
build the confidence of critics, as many believe that the NGOs play up crisis as part of an 
appeal for funds.131 
One of the strongest mechanisms that IRC uses for advocacy is through membership 
in the Sudan Advocacy Coalition Committee, an active group of NGOs that includes 
CARE, Oxfam and Save the Children among many other high profile organisations. 
These NGOs have joined together to promote the peace negotiations in Sudan, as well as 
document the plight of their combined beneficiaries. The Coalition promotes a dynamic 
stance on many contentious issues such as reintegration and mobilization of 
refugee/IDPs, and also shares information. 
IRCs position, between the government of Sudan, society, and international 
governments gives these organisations strength as advocates. They also have access to 
locally sourced, current, and important information. This access to information and 
governments allows the IRC, in theory, to promote change, create policy, and even 
influence national budgets. The need to balance each of these powers is often where most 
NGOs have difficultly. 
Advocacy for many NGOs encompasses a wide variety and creative methods of 
marketing and administrative mechanisms to demonstrate the need for public pressure. 
Fitzduff and Church note, a NGOs informality, spontaneity, flexibility are their greatest 
assets.132 Certainly, NGOs have a higher degree of creativity in the face of conflict or 
calamity. The film “Just Peace,” is a film created by the Sudanese Advocacy Coalition to 
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increase awareness of the peace process, the need for international support, and 
particularly for the inclusion of all of Sudanese society. With the main avenue of 
influence placed on pressuring the relatively inactive government to act. 
Advocacy, flexibility and creativity are important advantages of the IRC, but there are 
also factors that limit the IRC such as their frequent shortsightedness and singular focus. 
Some claim that the sheer size of NGOs will make them as bureaucratic as States or 
companies, while others contend that NGOs special interests will fragment civil society. 
Certainly the greatest argument against NGOs is their lack of accountability and long-
term, big-picture goals. For the purposes of this thesis, I will examine only a few major 
criticisms of the IRC, including: its lack of transparency, neo-colonial tendencies, 
advocacy issues, lack of sustainability due to donor mechanisms, and need for capacity 
building. These limitations will show the failure of the IRC to undertake its own mandate 
of improving good governance and the difficulty of doing so within an uncooperative 
State. These criticisms will show that despite positive aspects of the roles that the IRC 
plays in Sudan, the organisation does require some modifications in order to thrive in a 
challenging environment. 
As seen in national governments, without transparency of operations it is very 
difficult to hold an institution accountable, opening the door to abuse. Without 
accountability, values, ethics and the possibility of corruption are always in question. 
Transparency should be a part of any organisation or entity whose philosophical 
underpinnings are democratic. Certainly, the ability for NGOs to be perceived as 
accountable and transparent has its challenges. Certainly one of the greatest of all is a 
NGOs apolitical status, which clearly separates them from any government. The IRC sees 
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itself as being accountable to donors, home governments (whomever they report their 
income tax) and thirdly to its beneficiaries. There is a freedom in being away from 
donor’s scrutiny, with reports being the only channel of information. This can lead to the 
temptation to craft entirely favourable reports at the expense of accuracy.133  
Transparency is also needed to observe those NGOs that are not accomplishing their 
stated and visible goals. One set of ‘actors’ present in the not-for-profit scene promoting 
scepticism is those NGOs with less then altruistic goals. Known as “Astroturf” 
organisations, these are organisations that are funded solely to put forth a certain 
perspective, or even to sell consumer goods. The Global Climate Coalition is a classic 
example of this, as it was formed as an advocacy group to downplay the threat of global 
warming, and was funded entirely by oil companies.134 Similarly, the goals of some 
religious NGOs can be perceived only as proselytizing, and not contributing to the 
common good. It is imperative that NGOs give a clearer picture in regards to their 
income, expenditure, programmes, and planning. Income tax returns and some pertinent 
information are available online, but it is rare to have a full budget audit of the 
organisation. This should surprise some, as some Executive Directors can make over 
$500,000 (Can) annually, and organisations have budgets in the hundreds of millions. 
The IRC also does not maintain a high degree of transparency with their projects, 
donors or government relations. Project reports from the field, donor’s reports, and 
monitoring and evaluation reports are well-kept secrets and cannot be obtained by the 
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public or even other NGOs.135 Most would concur that there is a need to share this 
information, as it would further strengthen the abilities of NGOs, from learning best 
practices and elevating the quality of service overall. However, these documents are 
considered to contain ‘trade secrets’ or information that is sensitive, thus they are not 
released in full. In fact, when contacted regarding this project, an IRC spokesperson 
noted that simply discussing the organisation was difficult as Sudan is a “politically 
sensitive” area.136  
The protection of information from the public is needed in Sudan in order to create 
room to manoeuvre, as the IRC must insulate itself from the control of the Humanitarian 
Aid Commission in order to remain effective. Information that could be used to make a 
more efficient organisation can also be used against it to co-opt its operations. Therefore, 
the need to poise itself within a complicated bureaucracy and the beneficiaries is 
imperative to obtain some semblance of accountability, while also limiting the amount of 
information available to the government. Hence, the IRC gains their legitimacy from the 
communities in which they work, as the organisation is essentially a non-elected 
representative of the community. This is a controversial topic leading some authors such 
as Julie Hearn to claim that NGOs are a form of colonialism or pseudo-governments. 
While this tactic may leave room for some to question the legitimacy of the organisation, 
the IRC will ultimately have a greater capacity to effect change, of a more lasting and 
sustainable type, if it works with the Sudanese government while remaining autonomous 
advocates. 
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However, detractors feel that this push for NGOs presence as advocates is counter-
productive. In Nigeria, two NGOs (Actionaid and Oxfam) sit on the Millennium 
Development committee to monitor the implementation of policies of the Nigerian 
government. Critics contend that this is in direct violation of Nigeria’s sovereignty as 
these two NGOs have influence on an aid budget of over $31 million in a country of over 
130 million people.137 Rotimi Sankore questioned if this ‘step up’ for NGOs from 
advocacy roles to an advisory presence is heralding a new phase of intervention where 
NGOs will participate in the running of African countries. This is most certainly not the 
open objective of the IRC but it does suggest some very interesting questions regarding 
governance of a nation and accountability of NGOs. Who are NGOs accountable to?  
The IRC prides itself on being directly connected to communities. However, the 
authority that is granted to them is usually short term in nature. One major criticism of 
NGOs in general is their lack of sustainability. Very few, if any, projects are funded long-
term; in fact, all project proposals must be within the donor budget year, even those 
multi-year projects can be denied in the following year if the project does not meet 
expectations or if funding foci change. Funding for entire NGO programmes is only 
available to very few NGOs in Canada, leaving most to maintain their operations through 
project grants.138 Despite funding instability, the IRC needs to give the appearance of 
sustainability. It is often noted by NGOs and donors that if a project cannot self-sustain 
within the project scope, then it would be best be left up to the government. Therefore, 
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most projects, especially those in the areas of infrastructure, must have a plan in which to 
end the project. 
The jargon used by NGOs is that of ‘exit strategy,’ which is when the project is taken 
over by the community or by another NGO, or sometimes, even the government. This 
exit strategy is implemented when project funding has ceased, and no other funding can 
be found elsewhere. The author met with Sheiks (community leaders) in Kassala, in the 
North East of Sudan, where lack of donor interest brought to an end ongoing project 
funding, it was important to maintain good community relations in former project areas, 
listening to concerns and wishes, despite the knowledge of the lack of forthcoming 
funding for the region. In this case, the IRC gave the community false hope, as the lack of 
long-term planning meant that schools, water and sanitation and health projects in the 
region would cease as they could not be supported by the community. As an official from 
the IRC noted, “NGOs do some work but they lack an integrated approach. All do 
sectoral approach, not looking at demands on community to pay for services. They don’t 
ask what a community can sustain.”139  
Another impediment to this sustainability is the fact that NGOs have a high staff 
turnover rate. As Zoe Marriage notes, most relief workers are only in the country short-
term and do not build many relationships with strong political figures.140 This lack of 
personal connection in a community weakens the dialogue between the community and 
NGOs, making it easier to surrender an area when funding dries up. As one NGO aid 
worker in Southern Sudan noted, “you work with an NGO, tomorrow it’s not there. So 
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now they are targeting one area, they do not work properly and then move on to another 
area.”141 
The shifting of NGOs from area to area is largely due to their nature of funding. The 
greatest share of financial support to IRC comes from state-funded donors, and thus 
comes with strings attached. The ratio of private citizen giving can barely be compared 
anymore with the amount of foundation and governmental donor funding. This has 
created a dependence on state donors, which, in general, suffer from many of the same 
issues that NGOs are plagued with such as lack of transparency, accountability and 
partisanship. There is a certain level of flexibility needed between donors and NGOs, as 
noted above, as organisations must be able to change project objectives at a moment’s 
notice and have a variety of funding mechanisms – such as direct budgeting, and working 
with and through local NGOs. 
Donors for the most part do not identify the inherent problems with lack of 
transparency and accountability in a country, as they too are political actors giving money 
to specific areas, religions and sectors depending on their government’s objectives. For 
instance the Canadian Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), which was sent to 
Sri Lanka after the tsunami, was strategically sent to Tamil majority areas for 
assistance.142 As Canada has the largest number of Tamil refugees within its borders, it is 
not difficult to understand why the DART team focused less on Singhalese areas.  
One of the greatest issues that NGOs face is that they have incentives to avoid 
implicating themselves in failure, to deny responsibility and to exaggerate outcomes. As 
most donors are far removed from the operational theatre, it is no wonder that NGOs feel 
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the need to keep the donors satisfied with favourable reports of high numbers of 
beneficiaries and hide failures by limiting the amount of negative information available. 
This disconnect also encourages NGOs to feel that their ‘on the ground’ experience is 
wasted on donors, who rarely consult NGOs or Local NGOs (LNGOs) regarding strategic 
planning. A DFID (UK Department for International Development) official noted, “DFID 
has no legal or moral obligation to engage with civil society at a country level.”143 In a 
meeting between the author and the European Community Humanitarian Organisation 
(ECHO), the fund administrator noted “We only have money for water and sanitation in 
{this specific State}.”144 When asked the reason behind the strategic placement and types 
of services, the administrator responded that it was “political and complicated.”145 
Development branches for donor government engagement with NGOs in a recipient 
country are an afterthought. The Canadian Consulate in Khartoum in 2005-2006, for 
example, did not have an in-country CIDA representative, despite the fact that the 
Canadian government committed $90 million over two years to implementing and 
strengthening the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.146 Of this sum, $40 million was 
allocated to go to development resources in multi-donor trust funds, and $40 million for 
continued humanitarian assistance, with $10 million to support bilateral reconstruction 
and rehabilitation programmes.147 A Sudan CIDA representative was not in the country 
until two years after the funds were available, showing the lack of direct consultation 
when distributing funds. 
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There is an institutional demand to create the realities that donors insist on, a fantasy 
if you will, despite the actual situation. The IRC cannot and will not allow the project to 
fail, at least on paper. The donor must also persist in the appearance of success, as they 
are accountable to their own governments and voters. Given the power that international 
donors wield with other country governments, it is important that both international 
NGOs and local NGOs be consulted, as they will ultimately be tasked with the 
implementation of the donors’ mandates, and the political will of the people. 
Of concern for both governments and NGOs is the time frame of an “emergency.”148 
Despite peace agreements and lack of natural disaster, Sudan is still classified as an 
emergency setting by NGOs and donors. Relief work even now comprises the majority of 
IRC’s projects, and rehabilitation (development) work is still far off in many regions. 
Many groups claim that dependency in this emergency setting is an issue when it comes 
to relief work, as it will undermine the beneficiary’s ability to deal with the crisis on its 
own. In the case of Sudan, the protracted emergency situation has created a unique type 
of economy – an externally dependent war-economy, which is little understood.149 What 
will be important as the region moves toward peace is to create a stable platform for 
development to take root. 
Donors such as DFID, CIDA, and USAID have, for the past few years, been shifting 
focus to integrate lessons learned and to decrease administration costs. This has shifted 
programme-funded operations to project-funded and then to larger-scale programmes that 
have a local civil society component. This funding change challenges most NGOs as they 
still cannot prepare for the years ahead, generally exhibiting short-term thinking in order 
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to accommodate the whims of donors. There has been an effort by the NGOs in Sudan to 
move to a consolidated appeals process, such as the United Nations Sudan Work Plan. 
Administrated by the UN and NGOs, the Work Plan creates a year-long strategic funding 
and support plan that would fund most humanitarian, recovery, and development 
programming in Sudan. The Work Plan is a ‘wish list’ for NGOs, who use the document 
to garner greater international support through a mass appeal. The strategic plan includes 
all projects that the NGOs would like to undertake throughout the year. However, this has 
proved to be a difficult undertaking as, by the UN’s own admissions, funding 
mechanisms have delayed the implementation of these projects and only 49% of pledged 
non-food aid funding was received in 2006.150  
In another attempt to smooth out the budgetary issues, Afghanistan, for example, has 
been trying to monitor its own aid flow, which combines country level and international 
monitoring, the results of which can be found online.151 Donors and aid agencies want to 
coordinate, as they do not want to have overlapping funding with other organisations. 
Nevertheless it does happen, as in Banda Ache, when a little girl developed measles 
symptoms after receiving the immunization three different times from three agencies.152 
Competition for finite resources has forced most NGOs to divert attention from 
programme management, to fundraising, proposal writing, and event coordination. This 
competition sometimes forces out organisations that have partisan political or religious 
beliefs, or are too small to compete with the larger NGOs. Focused funding mechanisms 
target NGOs with specific experience and talent, which creates niche markets, and co-
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opts or expels others. The question remains as to whether NGOs will lose control of their 
agendas. Will donors push these community building blocks into areas in which they can 
no longer effect real change? 
Authors such as Charles Quist-Adede and Anita van Wyk claim that NGOs 
perpetuate a self-serving myth that allows them to gain the confidence of international 
communities and governments alike: that is, the belief that the developing world would 
be miserable without NGOs’ help.153 Africa holds a great amount of resources and wealth 
but NGOs, with their ‘poor-pornography’ and media coverage of only the harshest 
conflicts, portray Africa to be indeed the ‘Dark Continent.’ The formal ideology is the 
claim that NGOs around the globe are helping the “poorest of the poor.” Critics such as 
Rory Stewart note that this is not often the case. The ability to reach the poorest is 
hampered often by the lack of knowledge of an area or region. As NGOs enter an area, 
they often rely on groups of community leaders or elders, which in Sudan are most often 
men. These men are then the ones determining those who are the “poorest of the poor”. 
Obviously this can give way to partisanship and corruption within this system of 
selection. Those who benefit the elders could be chosen rather then the poorest in the 
community who are most often women, the elderly and the disabled who have been 
historically neglected by the community. 
This neglect of particular groups has led to the critique that International NGOs 
should not be working in countries that have functional local NGOs, as they are more 
able to target marginalized segments of society. These INGOs and LNGOs are often at 
odds, as donor dollars are targeted to go to those NGOs with ties to the donor 
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government. Only international NGOs can receive funding for projects in Sudan from the 
Canadian government for instance, despite local NGOs being both competent and 
efficient, and having solid community knowledge. LNGOs certainly would also come at a 
smaller administrative cost then international NGOs. An expatriate worker for the IRC, 
who comes from abroad can cost upwards of $CAD 80,000 to maintain however a local 
NGO worker of equal competence, education and knowledge would cost a small fraction 
of that.154  
For the most part, Sudan’s personnel would benefit from the continued utilization of 
the International Rescue Committee for capacity building. The ability to pass on 
knowledge from international workers to local staff encompasses the main reason for 
hiring local staff to key positions. IRC, like many NGOs, employs this practice of 
capacity building in most of their projects and practices. The organisation works to 
promote those local staff that have the ‘skills’ needed to manage a complex programme. 
The author was lent a local staff member with whom to work, and actively worked to 
pass along my knowledge. However, often this information worked in cooperation as the 
local staff member excelled in regional information, and the author aided with donor 
requirements. The need for international staff is a controversial issue as donors such as 
USAID, DFID, and CIDA require that all reports and proposals be submitted in the 
English language. Oddly, IRC’s donor reports were usually submitted in the host country 
to a person whose first language was Arabic, the second being English. Therefore a 
language barrier was created between two native Arabic speakers (the report writer and 
reader), who were forced to speak English due to convention. The need for international 
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specialized report writing teams would all but be eliminated if donors accepted reports in 
the language of the country. 
The IRC has a unique view of the State, as they are neither elected officials nor 
voters: they are constantly striving to maintain room to manoeuvre. The IRC views the 
State as an important component in their daily activities, but also as a hindrance. The fact 
remains that the IRC is limited in its authority not its resources, and the government has 
authority, but lacks resources. In an ideal sense, they would complement each other to 
make positive change. The IRC is, as an institution, lacking in depth and must constantly 
struggle for autonomy within the uncooperative government, while striving for effective 
projects with its small staff, weak funding mechanisms, uneven resources, and short-term 
mandates that hamper its ability to think long-term.155 The interdependency between the 
IRC and the Government of Sudan to provide aid in the country is a fragile association 
with the uncooperative government. Organisations in the country lament working with or 
through the Humanitarian Aid Commission, while the government of Sudan would 
unquestionably like to remove all international NGOs from the country keeping the aid 
money. One feels certain that the beneficiaries see it differently. Some argue that the 
government of Sudan might not be the best organisation for determining aid and 
development given their past and current tendency to use aid to further its strategic goals. 
This in turn has led to starvation, death, and massive migration. However, there can also 
be a problem when NGOs and the government join to provide these needs, as these State-
NGO partnerships can lead to cooptation, weakening their legitimacy to the community 
and donors.156 
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The relationship between the government of Sudan and its localities, as seen in 
Chapter Two, creates sycophants and spreads nepotism at the municipal level. As 
taxation and transfers to localities are uncommon, bribes are often needed to engage with 
the government system, with basic services at a pay-for-use structure. This can be seen in 
the visa system where gifts are given to government employees to process visas in a 
timely manner. NGO’s camp managers, who function at the same level as municipalities, 
can have greater accountability, fewer pay-for-use services, as well as fewer instances of 
bribery needed to obtain basic provisions. 
While there are a litany of ills that plague NGOs, they are vital in times of crisis. 
However, the IRC, quite simply, is too narrowly focused and has too short a funding 
horizon to work without the government of Sudan. Nevertheless, in times of crisis IRCs 
size and ability to focus its services and funding will enable it to fill the roles of 
providing health care, water and sanitation, and camp management, and will engage other 
NGOs to aid in food distribution or other services need. This substantial breadth and 
depth of operations of NGOs is sometimes of concern to governments, as they believe 
that NGOs may be instilling values or practices that go against its authority.157 In areas 
such as neglected Darfur or infrastructure-poor Southern Sudan, NGOs can be the only 
authority or organisation creating stability in the region, giving NGOs an appearance of 
governing the region in absentia. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusions and Recommendations for the Future 
 
Decades of war, structural adjustment programmes, weak and authoritarian 
governments, famine, and migration, have left the people of Sudan in a precarious 
position. On the verge of economic growth and/or war, this massive country with great 
disparities in wealth and power depending on region, is a land of polarization. NGOs that 
operate in the country have learned to cope with a high level of bureaucratic management 
by the Humanitarian Aid Commission branch of government, along with the natural 
infrastructure challenges, and have been able to accomplish many remarkable goals. The 
International Rescue Committee has altruistic objectives however its lack of cohesive 
policies has weakened the perception of their ability to provide accountable relief. This is 
especially ironic when, as with the IRC, the goal is to strengthen governance and civil 
society. 
The critiques levelled against NGOs are often valid. There must be a system of 
checks and balances for NGOs. Policing by funding agencies and donors places a strain 
on funding systems, however, it also lends legitimacy to the function of both donors and 
NGOs, as those that do not meet an acceptable level of accountability and transparency 
will not be funded in the future. But the level of policing must leave room for flexibility, 
as the ever-changing conditions on the ground are not accommodating of strict policies. 
One must accept and acknowledge the important contributions that NGOs like the IRC 
make in the face of emergencies: stabilization, creativity, ability to manoeuvre, and good 
governance. 
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As seen in the initial chapter, the concept of good governance is certainly a complex 
topic. NGOs must learn to navigate this terrain, putting into operation accountability 
mechanisms and policy decisions of the government. In order to solidify their positions as 
advocates, NGOs should clarify their terms of good governance, not just in their strategic 
plan and employee policies, but also with their beneficiaries who depend on their work to 
survive. The definitional issue should be addressed in stakeholder meetings and in staff 
training, including changing the definition of good governance to suit the needs and 
wishes of the community. What can be especially counter-productive for communities are 
definitions that have a lack of solid understanding such as ‘governance’ or ‘participation’. 
There is a serious need to define the terms in order to strengthen these areas, especially 
when good governance is a requirement of the IRC and its main funders. 
What is certainly apparent and repeated often in this thesis is the need for specific, 
situation appropriate and effective policies for the promotion of good governance and 
increased accountability in NGOs. These policies should be detailed and look at the 
political realities of the region in which they operate. There should be local level staff 
input into these policies, and they should be somewhat malleable to the local situation on 
the ground. NGO administrations claim that good governance policies are not a priority 
as the organisation in Sudan is in a state of emergency. However, the country has been in 
a state of emergency in one way or another since IRC entered Sudan (and decades before 
that). In the over two decades that IRC has spent in the country, there has been ample 
time to develop a country specific policy for its employees, and an appropriate 
organisational structure. Given the amount of interaction with government and militias, 
IRC needs a formal modus operandi regarding these groups. 
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As the bond between the Sudanese government and IRC grows, so too does the need 
to have a strong advocacy role in order to carve our room to manoeuvre. The current 
position of Policy Advocate for IRC Sudan must be strengthened, considering the 
growing importance of the role. This position should supervise the creation of good 
governance definitions for regional offices, and represent beneficiaries abroad and to the 
local government. The position should be tasked with bilateral education – both to and 
from the government. The Advocate must also advise all project coordinators and 
managers on effective and long-term strategies of good governance and give them the 
policy tools to strengthen civil society. This should also include aiding the field offices to 
create their own Codes of Conduct and policies regarding specific groups and networks. 
The role of the Sudan Advocacy Coalition should encourage its partners to join in the 
creation of good governance policies. As well, every new staff member should be trained 
in the area of good governance, including policies and regional concerns. 
In the same regard, mandates of donors should be tasked with preserving the present 
advocacy and project management roles of civil society and non governmental 
organisations. As aid has become politicized, the suspicion that NGOs act with political 
motives has increased. It is imperative that donors adopt policies for NGOs that are 
neutral, and provide good governance and accountability without hindering the 
management and decision-making. This would ensure that each organisation is held 
accountable, through an open dialogue to promote positive change. 
During the time the author was working in Sudan, an organisational audit of IRC was 
carried out by IRC-New York (head office), which aimed to improve the administrational 
strategy of the IRC-Sudan office. Numerous experts in budgeting, human resources and 
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management toured the programme and projects to give suggestions for the improvement 
of the operation. Unfortunately, to the detriment of the programme, the audit did not take 
into account the ability to pay for staffing, only the need for it. There was only a modest 
local staff input on the issues at hand and local civil society partners were not consulted. 
Consequently, the organisation developed what could be described as an under-funded 
top-heavy management structure, which has not been able to cope with the funding 
challenges. It is imperative that this bloated management structure regain its financial 
footing, as the increase of international staff members, especially at the higher levels, 
means a subsequent decrease in money spent directly on beneficiaries. Unconfirmed by 
IRC, this expansion of administration costs has meant using up to 80% of project budgets 
to fund staffing costs, which is an unacceptable proportion.158 
Another area that IRC must concentrate on is creating programme quality, as its 
current financial and project difficulties largely stem from over-stretching its financial 
resources. It is imperative that IRC focus its attention with a long-term view on areas in 
which it has expertise, and certainly only in areas that IRC currently has field stations, 
lest it overextend itself. IRC cannot take on the management of all sectors in large 
regions, as donor funding will always hinder the organisation’s long-term planning. This 
can be remedied with better coordination with the relevant government actors and other 
NGOs, who can fulfil the ‘exit strategy’ in the future. 
Finally, donor giving has changed the relationship with NGOs and host and home 
governments. The funding specifications have changed the role of the IRC from neutral 
entity, to one that promotes a western perspective of good governance. IRC represents 
Sudan and their beneficiaries at the supranational level including to the United Nations 
                                               
158 Anonymous Interviewee, Interview with the Author, January 21, 2008. 
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and the World Bank, and even to the Sudan government. This role as advocate has 
changed the perspective of NGOs as neutral entities, and shifted to create entities that 
critically analyse values. Therefore the IRC must improve its transparency with 
governments and other organisations to strengthen its good governance mechanisms. The 
IRC, which currently works with the Advocacy Coalition to fulfill this mandate, cannot 
simply rely on it, as the Coalition does not currently have teeth on the international scene 
or in Sudan. In order to do so, more staffing and funding is imperative. Currently, there is 
only one staff member who works with the Advocacy Coalition in Sudan, with two in 
Nairobi.  
This advocacy role must be linked directly with improved policies of ethics and 
accountability into the overall structure of the organisation. IRC should adopt the recent 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), and focus more on the transparency of 
its operations. The inclusion of IRC into the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 
would ensure that IRCs accountability would be on par with the strongest NGOs on the 
planet, making it a leader in its field, and fixing the serious reporting problems. Perhaps 
just as importantly, the key staffing areas must be filled in a timely manner. Those 
positions left vacant for long periods of time shift the burden of work on to fewer people, 
causing staff to burn out, and creating a ‘history void’, where important information is 
not passed on from staff to staff. 
The accountability mechanisms should also be improved in NGO reports. Information 
should not be a closely guarded secret, as these are not traditional businesses protecting 
profitability. Instead, to develop strong accountability these reports should be shared 
within the NGO community. Since the Sudanese government uses this information 
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against the NGOs, the information could be anonymized, for the sole purpose of 
knowledge exchange. Certainly, there is some information that needs to be guarded, 
especially when dealing with a corrupt government such as that of Sudan. However, if 
reports were released, there would be a stronger mechanism to keep the government in 
check, as reports of the frequent abuses occurring in Darfur would be documented on a 
regular basis. One NGO could not be targeted if all actors reported these issues. This 
transparency must also be put into effect in report writing. While few NGO are willing to 
admit that its methods or management have been incorrect, the passing on of best and 
worst practices is one of the few ways in which development organisations will be seen 
as accountable. A recommendation to this effect would see a more complete open and 
shared ‘lessons learned’ section for both proposal and report writing to donors. 
Many NGOs have contempt for the ever-changing funding strategy of governments. 
However, it is the opinion of this author that we are witnessing a positive move from 
purely state-to-state funding, to funding predominantly NGOs, to a return to inter-state 
transfers while keeping a strong advocacy role for NGOs. This can be seen as progress, 
as active country governments are better suited to conduct large-scale, long-term, multi-
sectoral operations. 
There are many criticisms of NGOs, however, I do not believe that the organisations 
have worked themselves out of a job quite yet, as their roles are ever-changing and much 
work still needs to be completed in Sudan. The good governance structures that the IRC 
promotes in its actions, but not necessarily its policies, is something that must be 
remedied in order to secure the organisation’s future workings with and against the 
Humanitarian Aid Commission and the Sudanese Government. The IRC’s programmes 
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of health care, camp management, and promotion of rule of law and its mandate of 
support for civil society combined with the link with the Humanitarian Aid Commission 
is a challenging relationship with the IRC constantly struggling for space to operate.  
The IRC will become more accountable and efficient in the future, as they become 
more settled and issue focused. IRC in particular should streamline its operations to focus 
on areas of specialization, and become strong advocates for the beneficiaries in its region 
of operation. An emphasis on clear and measurable objectives must be complemented by 
a willingness to monitor and evaluate results. Advocacy strategies should be kept 
immediate and local, and should only be undertaken with the consent of the majority of 
beneficiaries. Despite the fact that there are many criticisms, there is one universal belief: 
that the Sudanese people will depend on the IRC for many years to come. 
Further research should involve examining the linkages between States, 
NGOs/LNGOs, and donors as there is an inherent connection that shows how policy is 
created and implemented and how that can weaken or strengthen the developing world’s 
state structure. Trends in world funding are also something that should be studied in great 
depth, especially as it effects the roles NGOs play, as they are increasingly called on to 
provide government policy oversight while aligning their activities with those of donor 
and host governments.  
The balancing act that the IRC plays daily is precarious at best. The IRC attempts to 
be an advocate for its beneficiaries, but also must also brace itself from an uncooperative 
government known for its human rights abuses. The poise needed to manage both the 
needs of the people, the Humanitarian Aid Commission, and donors is remarkable, and 
would impress even the most skilled diplomat. IRC’s creativity, fluidity and ability to 
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shift allow it to be effective within this context. All things must change with time, and 
one can hope for the sake of many marginalized Sudanese that the International Rescue 
Committee can continue to find room to manoeuvre within this challenging situation. 
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